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The following case study is intended to describe the evolution of the American cable industry 
and the corporate actions pursued by its operators and sponsors since 1990’s. Charter 
Communications and Time Warner Cable, respectively the fourth- and second-largest cable 
operators, have been chosen to represent the industry trend of horizontal consolidation. On May 
23, 2015, both firms agreed to merge forming New Charter, along with parallel Charter’s 
acquisition of Bright House Networks. Even though the ultimate goal of this case is to analyse 
the merger transaction, a deep analysis of each company’s roots and a description of 
competition environment and regulation framework are also presented to provide the necessary 
insights to perceive its drivers. 
Being the terms of the merger and business valuation its cornerstone, this case aims to look into 
the acquirer leveraging up to finance the acquisition of a much larger company, after having 
been through a reorganization process under Chapter 11 for having too much debt, and a firm 
that spun-off its operations from its parent company, inheriting its name and management. 
Therefore, these two corporate actions are also presented in detail.  
For his key role on Charter’s growth, public exposure, personal wealth, and career 
accomplishments, as co-founding Microsoft the most noteworthy, a follow-up on the $12 
billion investment of Paul Allen in the cable industry is also described. 
 









Charter Communications and Time Warner Cable .................................................................... 1 
Cable Industry ............................................................................................................................ 2 
Video ...................................................................................................................................... 2 
High-speed Internet ................................................................................................................ 3 
Voice ...................................................................................................................................... 4 
Regulation .............................................................................................................................. 6 
Mergers and acquisitions ........................................................................................................ 7 
Charter Communications............................................................................................................ 8 
1993-1998: Growing through acquisitions ............................................................................. 8 
1998-1999: “Wired Word” - The rise of Paul Allen, and further consolidation .................... 8 
1999-2008: A successful IPO and operating as a public company ........................................ 9 
2009: Bankruptcy and Chapter 11 ........................................................................................ 11 
2010-2013: Second listing and Liberty Media investment .................................................. 12 
Time Warner Cable .................................................................................................................. 13 
1989-1993: The mergers ...................................................................................................... 14 
1994-2004: Acquisitions and Advance/Newhouse Partnership ........................................... 14 
2006: Transactions with Comcast ........................................................................................ 15 
2007-2008: Listing for liquidity and 4G investment ............................................................ 16 
2009-2013: Spin-off and further consolidation .................................................................... 17 
Charter/TWC ............................................................................................................................ 18 
Bidding war: Comcast and Altice ........................................................................................ 19 
Deal terms ............................................................................................................................ 21 
Liberty .................................................................................................................................. 21 
New Charter ......................................................................................................................... 22 
Decision .................................................................................................................................... 22 
Questions .................................................................................................................................. 23 
Teaching Note .......................................................................................................................... 24 
 
 
  1 
Charter Communications and Time Warner Cable 
It was a cloudy morning in New York on September 21, 2015 when Sir Christopher Hohn took 
an Uber ride from JFK airport to the New York Institute of Technology at the heart of 
Manhattan1. Representing the fifth-largest shareholder of Time Warner Cable (TWC) with a 
5% beneficial ownership, Chris Hohn flew to New York to attend TWC special shareholders 
meeting to vote the merger with Charter Communications, and to elect its form of payment. 
On 2003, Chris Hohn founded The Children´s Investment Fund Manager (TCI), a London-
based long-term-oriented equity hedge fund, managing approximately $10 billion in assets, 
where he still holds the managing position. He is known for his active investing attitude, 
purchasing equity stakes in companies and forcing management to make changes to increase 
share price, backed by long-term committed limited partners. As described by Chris Hohn “We 
are the antithesis of the classic hedge fund. We are the opposite. They are hedged, we are long. 
We take risk. They are short term whereas we are long term. They are passive, and we are 
engaged. They charge high fees, we charge less.”  
On March 6, 2015 when the merger of Comcast and TWC was under regulatory and antitrust 
revision, TCI almost doubled its equity stake in TWC.  
However, Paul Allen’s words were still popping up in his mind “We put too much debt on the 
company. It took me a while to find the right executive … but that was later in the game, when 
we had too much debt”. On the other hand, John Malone, the merger mastermind, commented 
“Thank you, Paul Allen” referring to his large personal investments in the company and tax 
loss carry forwards, “Charter will now be of a size where they can have meaningful VOD 
offering”. Should he rely on Malone’s words “The deal will not have major regulatory issues. 
If I thought we were [facing major hurdles], we wouldn’t have done this deal”? 
                                                 
1 A hypothetical scenario for the case illustration, although everything else is real, such as 
events, positions, ownership, and stakeholders. The presence of Chris Hohn at TWC special 
shareholder meeting is therefore not confirmed 
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Cable Industry 
The American merger-crazed cable industry has been living an era of digital disruption that 
challenges traditional business models, fierce competition among telecommunication giants, 
some of them inorganically formed through mergers and acquisitions, and a tight regulation 
framework. The business model of traditional cable companies like Charter Communications 
and Time Warner Cable (TWC) has relied in bundling two or more of its core products and 
services: traditional and advanced video services, high-speed Internet services, and residential 
voice services. Although with lower weight on revenues, it is also common to supply a range 
of cloud solutions to business customers. New Internet-based digital over-the-top (OTT) 
providers, social networks, and telephone companies developing new business segments have 
enhanced not only competition, but also litigation and legal dispute. 
 Video  
Traditional cable companies offer basic television packages with national and local channels 
for which customers pay a monthly charge. Additionally, customers have the option to upgrade 
their subscription adding High-Definition and premium content-specific channels, like music, 
sports, and commercial-free movies. Usually, these upgrades come with additional services that 
provide a more comfortable and convenient television experience, such as: Video-on-Demand, 
which offers the possibility to select a content/event anytime from a pre-selected list; Pay-per-
View, that allows customers to pay on a per-event basis; Digital Video Recorder, that adds the 
option of recording and pausing a live event and watch it later; and a mobile app, which 
basically supplies a television experience and all these tools on a smartphone. Due to the 
geographically clustered cable systems driven by its intense capital and licensing requirements, 
traditional overbuilds are rare, although the risk of market entrance is serious if the right amount 
of capital is put in place. Therefore, cable operators often do not compete with each other, 
unless if they start distributing video over the internet to customers outside their region.  
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The major competitors for cable systems are direct broadcasted satellites (DBS), that allow 
satellite reception through a dish antenna, and telephone companies through fiber-based 
networks. Due to video compression and increasing satellite power, DBS have been able to 
supply standardized nationwide offerings, and thus being able to enjoy synergies and to have 
lower costs due to inexistent franchising fees. DirectTV, the largest U.S.-based DBS, was 
acquired by AT&T in July 2015 for $67.1 billion. Concerning telephone companies, AT&T 
and Verizon have been increasingly adding video solutions to their bundles, hence leveraging 
existing customer base due to their traditional mobile phone services (Exhibit 1A graphs the 
largest American pay-television providers by subscribers as of June 2015, representing 95% of 
the market).  
A rising set of competitors, like Hulu, Netflix, iTunes (Apple), Prime (Amazon) and YouTube 
(Alphabet), offer video content through the Internet, some of them free of charge, boosted by 
the development of gadgets that allow Internet-broadcasting on television and mobile devices. 
These OTTs are the main drivers of disruption and innovation, not only for traditional cable 
and telephone companies, but also for regulatory bodies. 
According to the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI), which tracks customer 
satisfaction in a universe of 43 industries, the Subscription Television Service was considered 
as the second-worst industry by American consumers in 2015 with a score of 63 (National ACSI 
was 73.4) – Charter Communications also scored 63, and TWC was considered the worst 
operator with a score of 51. 
 High-speed Internet 
Traditional cable companies supply Internet services through hybrid fiber coaxial cable (HFC) 
networks, which allows to benefit from its bandwidth capacity, enabling traditional and two-
way video and broadband services, signal quality and high service reliability. The HFC 
networks can either be owned or leased, therefore subject to high capital expenditure, or a fee 
  4 
depending on the amount of IP-based traffic. To reduce Internet connectivity cost, cable 
companies usually enter into agreements with third-party networks to exchange traffic without 
a charge. HFC permits download speeds up to 300 Megabytes per second (Mbps), which are 
monthly charged, with pricing based on pre-agreed speed. In order to meet customer 
requirements, it is also possible to set a monthly utilization cap, from 5 Gigabyte (Gb) to 30 
Gb, which usually comes at lower monthly charge. Charter, for instances, upon completion of 
its analog-to-digital transmission, offers base download Internet speed of 60 Mbps, and 100 
Mbps in certain markets. Included on the Internet package are access to a nationwide network 
of WiFi hotspots for no additional charge, and software protection features. 
Regarding competition, the broadband Internet market is supplied by cable and telephone 
companies that are starting to add Internet data to their traditional voice bundles. Telephone 
companies use digital subscriber line (DSL), fiber-to-the-home (FTTH), and wireless 
broadband services. DSL allows to offer Internet access at greater speed than conventional 
telephone lines, and it is a direct competitor to high-speed services offered by cable companies 
due to its reliability and lower cost at lower speeds. As larger telephone companies have 
invested in FTTH networks in some areas, they provide the same speed as cable companies. 
Additionally, these companies supply 3G and 4G wireless high-speed Internet services, with 
5G and faster services in the pipeline (Exhibit 1B graphs the largest American broadband 
Internet providers by subscribers as of June 2015, representing 94% of the market). 
Americans considered the Internet Service Providers as the worst industry in the U.S. in 2015, 
also scoring 63 in the ACSI – TWC and Charter scored 58 and 57, respectively. 
 Voice 
Fixed residential and commercial voice services are supplied by cable companies using Voice 
over the Internet Protocol (VoIP) technology to transmit digital voice signals over their 
networks. Residential voice plans offer unlimited calling to the U.S. and for some foreign 
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countries. TWC, for instances, designed its unlimited-calling voice plan for wired 
communications to the U.S. and the U.S. territories, Canada, Mexico, China, Hong Kong, India, 
Norway, and the European Union, for a fixed monthly fee. For the rest of the world, it offered 
the Global Penny Phone Plan, which allowed customers to communicate for a penny per 
minute. Just like in video services, basic plans have been upgraded with popular features, such 
as, a mobile app that enables customers to access their home phone services – receive and place 
calls, send text messages, and manage voicemail – on a mobile device free of charge over a 
WiFi or cellular data connection, web portal to customize voice features and to access texting 
data, and simpler features, like voicemail, call waiting, caller ID, and call forwarding.  
For business customers, offerings are more customer-tailored services, but they basically 
include voice trunking services like Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), thus providing higher 
capacity, and metropolitan-area Ethernet, which extends customer reach within its metropolitan 
area and links geographical disperse offices’ lines into a large private network. 
Competition for voice services come from multiple sources and is considerably high. Although 
in fixed voice services only telephone companies present direct wireline competition, wireless 
solutions, other ways to communicate, and innovation brought several different types of 
competitors. Telephone companies jointly offer wireless and wireline voice solutions to their 
customers, and therefore they can be seen as direct (fixed voice) and indirect (mobile voice) 
competitors (Exhibit 1C displays the largest American residential fixed voice operators by 
subscribers as of June 2015).  
Other wireless and OTT providers like Vonage, Skype, and magicJack also offer a substitute 
voice service. Furthermore, new ways to communicate have strengthen competition, like instant 
messaging (WhatsApp), social networking (Facebook and Twitter), and video conferencing 
(also Skype), not forgetting also traditional ways like text messaging and e-mail.  
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The Fixed-Line Telephone Service scored 69 in the ACSI, thus being the fourth-worst industry 
in U.S. in 2015 – Charter scored 69 and TWC scored 63.  
 Regulation 
Cable operators are aggressively regulated by federal (mainly the Federal Communications 
Commission), state and regional governments, and it is permanently subject to changes and 
adaptations. The ultimate goals of cable and communications regulators are to enhance 
competition and to guarantee that supply is aligned with customers’ interests. The 
Communications Act of 1996 aims to set a more competitive environment by encouraging 
private investment and innovation so that Americans can be served with high-quality and full-
speed services.  
Regarding video services, cable companies are subject to “must carry” and “retransmission 
content” regulations. The first one requires cable systems to carry and broadcast local television 
stations upon their request. The second one states that popular television stations can prohibit 
cable carriage, unless a retransmission consent is negotiated. Agreed compensations with 
popular stations have substantially increased operators’ operating costs. Additionally, 
regulators have limited exclusive service contracts for multiple dwelling units (MDU) 
complexes, such as schools, universities, condos, and hotels. Also, in communities where FCC 
perceives no effective competition, rates charged for basic cable service, including installation 
and equipment, are limited. Another example is related to franchise agreements that cable 
companies use and rely to operate their systems, which are limited awarded by local franchising 
authorities and have a limit fee of 5% of revenues. FCC has taken actions to guarantee more 
favorable terms to new entrants than existing cable operators. Due to the importance of 
franchise agreements in the business model, if no renewal happens at termination, it can be 
extremely harmful to existing cable companies. 
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Related to Internet services, on February 2015, the FCC reclassified Internet services as a 
telecommunication service, thereby subject to the Title II regulation acts on rates, prices 
charged to consumers, information security and privacy. As stated by the President of the 
United States, Barack Obama:  
“Without strong competition, [broadband] providers can (and do) raise prices, 
delay investments, and provide sub-par quality of service. When faced with limited 
or non-existent alternatives, consumers lack negotiating power and are forced to 
rely on whatever options are available. In these situations, the role of good public 
policy can and should be to foster competition and increase consumer choice.” 
Fran Shammo, Chief Financial Officer at Verizon, took the opposite side: 
"Title II is an extreme and risky path that will jeopardize our investment and the 
development of innovation in broadband Internet and related services." 
The Title II reclassification is meant to promote net neutrality and to increase broadband 
competition. 
 Mergers and acquisitions 
The telecommunication industry has generated several billion-dollar transactions both from 
strategic and financial sponsors, as opportunities for synergies are evident (Exhibit 2 presents 
a list of public telecommunications transactions). Strategic acquirers have relied their growth 
on acquiring single to multiple cable systems to enhance their cable passings in areas they 
already operate, and to enter into new uncharted areas where they have no passings. To reduce 
the effect of overbuilding and to increase penetration ratio, big operators permanently seek the 
right moment and the right target to create telecom giants, by merging with other national 
providers. Due to the regulatory condition, alternative ways to consolidate are pursued, such as 
customer- and system-swap agreements, and join-ventures, which are common on disruptive 
service lines that require large capital investment and business development.  
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Charter Communications 
Charter Communications is an American cable and multiple-system operator (MSO), with 
products and services ranging from entertainment to information and telecommunications 
solutions, serving approximately 6.4 million U.S.-based residential and commercial customers 
across 28 states (as of June 2015). Often organized in bundles to streamline customer 
purchasing and to guarantee convenience, services like video (HD Television), Internet and 
voice are offered on a subscription basis, which are marketed under the brand name Charter 
SpectrumTM. Charter’s advertising services are marketed under the Charter MediaTM brand. 
History 
Charter Communications was founded in January 1993 in St. Louis, Missouri through the 
acquisition of Cencom Cable Associates by three former executives, Howard Wood (former 
President and CEO), Barry Babcock (former COO) and Jerald Kent (former CFO), after Crown 
Media acquired Cencom Cable Associates in 1991 for $1 billion.  
1993-1998: Growing through acquisitions 
Charter’s initial strategy was to grow through acquiring small to medium southwestern cable-
related business providers, such as telecommunications and video data systems (Exhibit 3 
presents a list of Charter’s early acquisitions). Charter paid, on average, between $1,500 and 
$2,000 per subscriber on these acquisitions, thus raising over $2 billion in equity and debt to 
fund them. If at the end of 1995 Charter was ranked as the 15th largest U.S.-based MSO, serving 
900,000 customers, on February 1997 it passed the 1 million subscribers mark (Exhibit 4 shows 
Charter’s subscription base acquired per state), and on May 1998 it positioned in the top 10. 
1998-1999: “Wired Word” - The rise of Paul Allen, and further consolidation 
Following Bill Gates’s Microsoft $1 billion investment in Comcast (the fourth-largest U.S.-
based MSO) in July 1997, Paul Allen, co-founder of Microsoft, entered the cable business 
through the acquisitions of Dallas-based Marcus Cable for $2.78 billion in April 1998, and 
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Charter Communications for $4.46 billion or $3,800 per subscriber in July 1998, paying $2.5 
billion in cash for the equity stake and assuming roughly $1.9 billion in debt. The consolidation 
of the two companies gave him access to 2.4 million subscribers, and made Charter 
Communications the seventh-largest U.S.-based MSO.  
The consolidation strategy and the clustering process continued in 1999 towards the state of 
California and the Eastern region (Exhibit 5 presents Charter’s acquisitions in 1999).  
The rumours about an Initial Public Offering (IPO) for the second half of 1999 were confirmed 
in March 1999, aiming to raise $2-$3 billion in equity to continue financing pending and future 
acquisitions, alongside personal investments from Paul Allen. As of July 1999, he had invested 
personally $11 billion in the cable industry, making his single largest investment ever. It is 
notorious an increase in the price per subscriber on Charter’s acquisitions after Paul Allen 
started investing in the cable industry, ranging from $2,500 to $4,900.  
At the end of July 1999, after the announcement of Bresnan acquisition, Charter filed a 
prospectus with the SEC proposing a sale of $3.45 billion worth of Class A common stock. By 
this time, it was managing a subscription base of 6.2 million (pending completion of all 
transactions), making it the fourth-largest U.S.-based MSO, behind AT&T with 16 million, 
Time Warner with 12 million, and Comcast with 6.2 million.  
1999-2008: A successful IPO and operating as a public company  
On November 8, 1999 Charter Communications, Inc. (NASDAQ: CHTR) raised $3.55 billion 
to partially fund pending and future acquisitions, through an equity sale of 195.55 million shares 
at a unit price of $19 (target price ranged $17-$19), the nation’s second-largest IPO after the $4 
billion equity sale of Conoco, Inc. in 1998. Having his Class B common stock the same unit 
price and 10 times the voting power of the Class A common stock held by public investors, 
Paul Allen would control 93.6% of the voting power of all Charter’s capital stock immediately 
after the public offer. This controlling power includes membership units purchased from 
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Charter Communications Holding Company, LLC (sole subsidiary of Charter 
Communications, Inc. and indirect owner of all operating cable systems and other service 
subsidiaries) for $750 million at the time of the IPO, plus his stake in Charter Investment, Inc. 
(Exhibit 6 displays Charter’s ownership and organizational structure after the IPO). Thus, 
considering beneficial ownership, the IPO meant an equity sale of 34.1% of Charter 
Communications, Inc., leaving Paul Allen with 55.4% of beneficially ownership.  
The 1999 year-end report reveals that Charter was highly levered, being consolidated net debt 
roughly 9x EBITDA2. In addition to Charter’s cash-based acquisition strategy, its business 
operations required heavy capital expenditures, primarily to upgrade, rebuild, and expand its 
legacy systems, amounting to $1.3 billion in 1999. Furthermore, Charter planned a $5.6 billion 
two-year capital expenditure plan – $3.1 billion to upgrade its bandwidth capacity and $2.5 
billion to systems extensions and development of new products and services – even though its 
cash flow from operations were only $382.2 million. Nevertheless, the IPO allowed to smooth 
the cash requirement to fund pending and future acquisitions, partially funded by exchangeable 
membership units in Charter Communications Holding Company thereafter. 
The letter of intent signed with AT&T Broadband, LLC. in the end of 1999, becoming official 
in February 2001, strengthens the clustering process by swapping non-strategic cable systems, 
involving several strategical cable system transactions. In fact, the acquisition-crazed strategy 
during 1999-2002 was replaced by customer-swap agreements and divestitures in non-strategic 
regions during 2003-2008. The 1999-2002 strategy resulted in an investment of $16.7 billion 
in acquisitions, giving access to a customer base of more than 4.5 million. Due to high 
indebtedness, Charter starts to sell cable systems in 2003 to meet the debt service and to repay 
                                                 
2 As of December 31, 1999, total debt was approximately $11,025 million, cash and cash 
equivalents $84.30 million, and EBITDA $1,219 million 
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bank debt (Exhibit 7 lists Charter’s acquisitions in 2000-2008, and Exhibit 8 summarizes a list 
of asset sales in 2003-2008).  
From 2000 to 2008, consolidated revenues grew from $3,141 million to $6,479 million, net 
income was negative during all the period – $858 million and $2,451 million, respectively – 
and EBITDA increased from $1,490 million to $2,319 million. Net debt escalated from $12,930 
million to $20,706 million, whereas net interest expense rose from $1,052 million to $1,903 
million. 
2009: Bankruptcy and Chapter 11 
The level of debt in Charter’s balance sheet and its disability to generate cash from operations 
or to issue more debt led one of its subsidiaries, CCH II, LLC. to default on an interest payment 
on March 16, 2009 regarding its 10.25% senior notes due 2010, which triggered a default of 
Charter’s other obligations under cross-default provisions. The 30-days grace period for the 
interest payment was not completed, since on March 27 Charter and certain creditors filed 
petitions for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code3. 
The Reorganization Plan was submitted on May 7, and confirmed by Bankruptcy Court on 
November 17, becoming effective on November 30, considered the largest and most complex 
prearranged bankruptcies ever attempted4 (Exhibit 9 illustrates Charter’s beneficial ownership 
before Chapter 11 filings). JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the agent for a syndicate of senior 
lenders, argued against the reorganization plan, the not change in control, and Charter’s ability 
                                                 
3 Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code regulates the reorganization process of a 
debtor that has failed its financial obligations with creditors. It involves restructuring the 
balance sheet, mainly the debt and equity structure (if insolvent, previous equity is whipped 
out). It can be filed by the debtor to protect its assets from creditors looking to liquidate 
(collateral takeovers), or by its creditors that realize a mismanagement situation or fraudulent 
activities. In either scenario, a reorganization plan with financial projections is submitted for 
Bankruptcy Court analysis. The logic behind the Chapter 11 is that company’s assets are worth 
more as an on-going operation than the sum of its parts if sold individually. 
 
4 “United States Bankruptcy Judge, Honorable” Peck, James M. November 17, 2009. United 
States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York, Chapter 11, Case No. 09-11435  
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to emerge from bankruptcy, filing a lawsuit against CCO Holdings and Charter 
Communications Operating after the drawdown of $250 million from senior credit facilities on 
November 2008, claiming that management was aware of the event of default.  
Total debt was reduced in approximately $8.4 billion, from $21.7 billion to $13.3 billion (total 
assets increased from $13.9 billion to $16.7 billion), allowing to cut interest expense in roughly 
$830 million annually (Exhibit 10 lists Charter’s debt structure before Chapter 11 filings). The 
reorganization plan reduced Paul Allen’s beneficial ownership from 49.0% to 7.2% (upon 
exercise of warrants and all convertible equity securities), and restricted his voting power from 
91% to 40% (Exhibit 11 summarizes the recapitalization plan and settlements). 
Apart from the key role of Paul Allen in the process, CCH I, LLC. noteholders were the 
cornerstone of its success, forgiving more than $4 billion of debt in exchange for new equity, 
and injecting more than $1.6 billion in cash in the equity rights offering. This group of investors 
was formed by private equity funds and mutual funds, namely Apollo Management, Franklin 
Advisers, Oaktree Capital, and Crestview Partners, with beneficial ownership of 31.4%, 18.8%, 
17.8%, and 9.8%, respectively. Together, this group had controlling interest of roughly 49%. 
This has been a common strategy among these asset classes, acquiring depressed low-valued 
debt securities before filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, and then entering in debt-to-
equity swap agreements on the reorganization process to come out as equity owners, thus 
capturing future upside. 
2010-2013: Second listing and Liberty Media investment  
On 2010, the first full-year after emerging from bankruptcy, Charter improved its operating 
performance, increasing EBITDA from $2,493 million to $2,599 million, registering an 
historical positive free cash flow of $710 million, increasing cash from operations in $1,317 
million to $1,911 million, and reducing net loss to $237 million. On September 14, 2010 Charter 
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re-listed its Class A common stock on the NASDAQ Stock Market, offering liquidity to 
stockholders’ equity and warrants investment. 
On January 18, 2011 Paul Allen converted his 2.2 million high-voting Class B common stock 
(securities that allowed him to have at least 35% of voting power) into Class A common stock, 
and two board members previously elected by Paul Allen resigned on the same date, resulting 
in an effective change of control. During the same year, Charter repurchased $725 million of 
its Class A common stock, partially sold by Apollo Management and Oaktree Capital under 
private repurchase agreements.  
On February 13, 2012 Thomas Rutledge became President and CEO of Charter. As of February 
29, Paul Allen interest in Charter was valued at $480 million, meaning an ownership of 6.49%5. 
On May 1, 2013 Liberty Media Corporation6 acquired funds’ equity stake (Apollo, Oaktree, 
and Crestview) of Charter for $2,688 million, becoming the single largest shareholder with 
beneficial ownership of 27.3%7. Liberty’s Chairman of the Board John Malone, who was 
appointed to Charter’s Board of Directors, explained it as an investment on “probably the best 
operating team in the business”. On July 1, Charter acquired Bresnan Broadband Holdings and 
its subsidiaries from Cablevision for $1,625 million in cash, funded with a $1,500 million term 
loan (due 2020), which increased its footprint by 375,000 customers. 
Time Warner Cable 
TWC is the second-largest American cable company only behind Comcast, providing video 
programming (HD Television and Video-on-Demand), high-speed data (Road RunnerTM) and 
voice services (digital phone), to 15.5 million residential and commercial customers along 29 
                                                 
5 At this date, Paul Allen held 6,847,990 shares of Class A common stock, at end-of-day price 
of $70.13. SEC 10-K filings for following years do not report any ownership held by him 
6 Liberty Media Corporation spun-off Liberty Broadband Corporation on November 4, 2014, 
becoming the latter the beneficial owner of Charter 
7 Liberty Media purchased 26,858,577 shares of Class A common stock, and warrants 
exercisable for 1,083,296 shares of Class A common stock, at a unit price of $95.50 per share  
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states (as of June 2015). Its technologically advanced well-clustered cable systems locate in 
five geographic areas – New York, the Carolinas, the Midwest, Southern California, and Texas. 
History 
The history of TWC dates back to June 1968 when American Television and Communications 
(ATC) planted the roots of a cable system. In 1973 Warner Communications formed Warner 
Cable, and Time Inc. integrated its under-performing cable systems into ATC in exchange for 
9% ownership in the company, becoming wholly owner in 1978, although ending up selling 
18.7% to public stockholders immediately after.  
 1989-1993: The mergers 
In 1989, Time Warner Inc. was formed through the acquisition of Warner Communications and 
its subsidiaries by Time Inc. for approximately $14 billion – financed by $8.3 billion in long-
term debt, and $5.6 billion in equity – after Paramount Communications announced its hostile 
takeover bid of $10.7 billion. Although under the same ownership and controlling umbrella, 
since ATC was traded in the stock market, Time Warner and ATC operated as separated entities 
until 1992, when Time Warner repurchased the ATC’s public equity for $1.3 billion in debt 
notes, and merged it with its existing operations to form TWC. By that time, ATC managed 
cable systems serving 4.8 million customers. At the end of 1993, the consolidation allowed 
TWC to become the second-largest MSO, serving 7.2 million cable subscribers in 34 states. 
 1994-2004: Acquisitions and Advance/Newhouse Partnership  
Until 1994 TWC grew largely due to the increase in customers of its own cable systems and 
the development of geographically-clustered systems through swap agreements and divestitures 
in non-core regions. However, during the year of 1994 several cable transactions were 
announced to maintain its customer growth rate (Exhibit 12 summarizes Time Warner Cable 
acquisitions for the period 1995-2013).  
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Moreover, on April 1, 1995 Time Warner Entertainment (TWC parent company) and 
Advance/Newhouse formed a cable television joint-venture (TWEAN partnership) serving 4.5 
million customers to enhance management of certain cable systems, leveraging Time Warner’s 
customer-service facilities. Time Warner Entertainment owned two-thirds and assumed the 
management of the partnership. Internal growth of existing cable systems combined with the 
acquisition strategy and the partnership allowed TWC to increase its customer base to 11.7 
million at the end of 1995, from 7.4 million at the end of 1994. 
Unhappy with Time Warner’s partnership management, on December 2002, certain cable 
systems serving 2.1 million customers, mostly in Florida, were spun-off so that 
Advance/Newhouse could take the supervision of the day-to-day operations. However, the 
partnership continued as remaining cable systems were still under the terms of the joint-venture. 
The new owner of spun-off systems called TWEAN Subsidiary was renamed to Bright House 
Networks in April 2003. Largely due to this transaction, customer base beneficially owned by 
TWC decrease to 10.9 million at the end of 2003.  
In fact, the acquisition strategy announced in 1994 resulted in only three significant 
acquisitions. Instead, TWC relied its customer base and passing footprint growth in establishing 
partnerships and joint-ventures with other major cable operators, such as AT&T, Comcast, and 
Advance/Newhouse. On 2004 annual report, Time Warner reaffirmed that it planned to expand 
its cable business through acquisitions. 
 2006: Transactions with Comcast 
On July 31, 2006 TWC and Comcast completed a serious of transactions, including the 
acquisition of Adelphia Communication’s cable systems, the redemption of Comcast’s interests 
in TWC’s subsidiaries, and several customer-swap agreements to enhance geographic clusters 
of subscribers for both companies. For Adelphia’s acquisition TWC paid $8.9 billion in cash 
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and $5.5 billion in Class A common stock8, representing 16% of its capital stock, to Adelphia’s 
creditors given Chapter 11 emerging reorganization plan. Moreover, Comcast acquired 
remaining cable systems for $3.6 billion in cash, which were mostly used in the swap 
agreements. Upon closing of these transactions, Time Warner Cable increased its subscription 
base in 3.2 million (acquired approximately 4 million, and transferred 0.8 million to Comcast) 
to 14.6 million, being the largest cable operator in New York City and Los Angeles. 
Also in 2006 TWC become a participant in a wireless joint venture named SpectrumCo, LLC. 
along with other cable companies, for which it contributed with $633 million. The venture 
secured the winning bid on the FCC auction for certain advanced wireless spectrum licenses. 
 2007-2008: Listing for liquidity and 4G investment 
On March 1, 2007 TWC’s Class A common stock began trading in the New York Stock 
Exchange under the symbol “TWC”. The offer did not result in any proceeds to TWC, since 
only the common stock held by Adelphia creditors were listed. Hence, Time Warner, Inc. 
(TWC’s parent company) kept its beneficial ownership of 84%, and voting power of 90.6% 
resulting from its high-voting Class B common stock (Exhibit 13 displays TWC’s and Time 
Warner’s ownership structure after the listing).  
On November 2008, several companies jointly invested $3.2 billion in Clearwire Corporation, 
a wireless broadband communications company focused on creating the first nationwide fourth-
generation wireless network. Along with Intel, Google, Comcast, and Bright House Networks, 
TWC alone invested $550 million – representing a 4.47% ownership – aiming to provide mobile 
broadband services to its wholesale and retail customers. On 2009, Clearwire shareholders 
agreed on a follow-on investment of $1.6 billion, which $103 million were funded by TWC. 
At the end of 2008, TWC registered consolidated revenues of $17,200 million, an exceptional 
net loss of $7,344 million (due to $14,822 million of non-cash impairment to reduce the 
                                                 
8 155,913,430 shares of Class A common stock were attributed, at a unit valuation of $35.28  
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carrying value of its cable franchise rights), EBITDA of $6,186 million, and free cash flow of 
$1,733 million. Its net debt was $12,279 million, leading to net interest expense of $923 million.  
2009-2013: Spin-off and further consolidation 
On May 20, 2008 TWC announced a legal and structural separation from its parent company 
Time Warner, Inc. becoming effective on March 12, 2009. The spin-off involved, in this order, 
(1) the conversion of Time Warner’s 12.43% ownership in TW NY Cable Holding, Inc., a 
subsidiary of TWC, in 80 million shares of Class A common stock, (2) the distribution of a 
special dividend to all shareholders holding Class A and Class B common stock of $10.27 per 
share, resulting in an aggregate amount of $10,856 million, (3) the conversion of all Class A 
and Class B common stock to TWC’s common stock on a 1-for-1 basis, (4) a reverse stock split 
at a 1-for-3 ratio to reduce the special dividend negative effect on stock price, and (5) the 
allocation of TWC shares to Time Warner’s shareholders on a pro-rata basis (0.083670 TWC 
share per each Time Warner share owned). Time Warner received $9,253 million from the 
special dividend as the spin-off proceeds, and allowed it to focus on media content and 
entertainment business. Jeff Bewkes, Time Warner’s President and CEO commented: 
“This is the right step for Time Warner and Time Warner Cable stockholders. After 
the transaction, each company will have greater strategic, financial and 
operational flexibility and will be better positioned to compete. Separating the two 
companies also will help their management teams focus on realizing the full 
potential of the respective businesses and will provide investors with greater choice 
in how they own this portfolio of assets. We’re bullish on Time Warner Cable’s 
prospects, but its strategic goals and capital needs are increasingly different from 
those of our other businesses.”9 
Glenn Britt TWC’s President and CEO added:  
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“In a single transaction, we increase our strategic and financial flexibility, simplify 
our capital structure, enhance the public float and liquidity of our stock and return 
substantial capital to our stockholders.”9  
On March 2010, the Board announced that TWC would begin to distribute a quarterly cash 
dividend of $0.40 per share, and to pursue a $4 billion share repurchase program, which 
increased to $8 billion afterwards. The cash dividend increased progressively thereafter, 
reaching a quarterly cash dividend of $0.75 in 2014, and since its inception the repurchase 
program resulted in the acquisition of 92.9 million shares for $7,744 million. 
From 2011 to 2013, TWC acquired strategic cable systems and cable-related business providers 
for approximately $4.2 billion (see Exhibit 12), and sold its ownership in SpectrumCo for 
$1,112 million, resulting in a customer footprint of 15.2 million at the end of 2013. 
Charter/TWC  
On May 23, 2015 Charter Communications and TWC entered into an agreement to merge all 
their cable systems into a new public company named New Charter, pending both companies’ 
shareholder voting and regulatory approval. On the day before the agreement, Charter and TWC 
closed the trading session at $175.33 and $171.18 per share, respectively (Exhibit 14 
summarizes historical financial data for both companies, and Exhibit 15 lists peers’ metrics).  
Few weeks before, on March 23, 2015, Charter Communications announced the acquisition of 
BHN. Both transactions were intended to form a cable giant to compete with the cable leader 
Comcast. As of August 20, 2015, the day shareholders receive the merger prospectus, Charter 
and TWC closed session with unit price of $182.74, and TWC $187.62.  
                                                 
9 Time Warner Cable, Investor Relation (2008). Time Warner and Time Warner Cable agree 
to separation. [press release]. Retrieved from: http://ir.timewarnercable.com/investor-
relations/investor-news/financial-release-details/2008/Time-Warner-and-Time-Warner-Cable-
Agree-to-Separation/default.aspx 
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Bidding war: Comcast and Altice  
“It is actually something I have been pursuing for a long time”, said Thomas Rutledge upon 
the merger announcement, and it was indeed a challenging back-and-forth process.  
In fact, from July 2013 and January 2014, Charter sent three unsolicited offers to TWC’s board. 
In its last offer on January 14, Charter increased previous bids of $114 and $127 to $132.50 per 
share, a 10 cents premium of previous day closing price, thus valuing TWC at $61.3 billion 
(equity value of $37.3 billion). All of them were promptly rejected by the board. TWC CEO 
Robert Marcus commented, “Charter’s last proposal is a nonstarter”, adding that TWC was 
seeking for a proposal of $160 per share, including a $100 in cash.  
On the next lane following this negotiation was the largest cable operator Comcast, which ended 
the bidding race on February 12, 2014 with a winning all-stock offer of $158.82 per share, 
valuing TWC at $69 billion (equity value of $45.2 billion) or 8.3x 2014 estimated EBITDA. 
The offer meant a premium of 17.4% to the previous day closing price of $135.31. However, 
Charter was not giving up on TWC assets, and secured a swap agreement for some of its cable 
systems. As it would put together the two largest U.S. MSO, FCC and Department of Justice 
(DOJ) raised competition and innovation issues due to the large size of the combined operator 
and its large influence on broadband and pay TV, therefore harming public and customers’  
interests. Knowing that regulatory consent would not be given, on April 24, 2015 both 
companies mutually agreed to call off the merger and transactions with Charter. On TWC’s 
statement, Marcus stated “We have always believed that Time Warner Cable is a one-of-a-kind 
asset. We are strong and getting stronger”.   
No doubt that Rutledge shared the same opinion, as on the exact same day he expressed interest 
in combining both firms. On May 5, Marcus refused Rutledge’s offer of $172.50 per share, to 
be paid $100 in cash and in 0.387 Charter shares per TWC share, a 21.4% premium from 
$142.13 previous closing.  
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When everyone was expecting that a Charter/TWC merger was pending a last round of 
negotiation, a European multinational cable and telecommunications company entered in the 
race. On the same day Charter offer was refused, Altice CEO Dexter Goei allegedly showed 
interest in entering in the U.S. cable market through a transaction with TWC. Although Altice 
Chairman Patrick Drahi claimed Altice did not bid for TWC, an offer from $180 to $200 per 
share was on the table (as TWC reports, an NDA was signed with a European 
telecommunications multinational).  
As Charter was aware of a new bidder, on May 16 Charter secured along with its largest 
shareholders, Liberty Broadband, a commitment of a follow-on equity financing to partially 
fund the cash consideration of the next bid for TWC, and that they would be willing to rollover 
their investment in TWC, by exchanging its stake for Charter stock without no cash 
consideration. Additionally, they stated that Liberty Interactive was willing to accept the same 
terms on their TWC stock, thus reducing Charter’s financing needs. Therefore, on May 18 
Charter’s board authorized a $190 per share offer, consisting of $100 in cash and 0.485 shares 
of Charter, to be discussed by TWC Board of Directors on a special meeting on May 21.  
On May 20, Altice (allegedly) stated that they would not be able to submit a valid bidding offer 
until the next TWC board meeting10. On the next day, Charter’s board met to revise the offer, 
and authorized an offer of $195.71 per TWC share, based on Charter’s stock price of May 20. 
TWC board accepted the offer and a merger agreement was signed on May 23, being the public 
announcement set for May 26, where Charter, TWC and BHN announced the New Charter. 
                                                 
10 Due to the NDA signed between the European company and TWC, and the claim of Altice 
Chairman of not having bided for TWC, Altice is stated only as a guess of a possible candidate 
during negotiations. On May 19, Altice announced the acquisition of a 70% in Suddenlink for 
an enterprise value of $9.1 billion.  
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Deal terms 
Regarding the specifics of the transaction, TWC’s shareholders, other than Liberty, were asked 
to elect the desired compensation mix between cash and stock, with the right to either (A) 
receive $100 in cash and 0.5409 shares of Charter Class A common stock, or (B) receive $115 
in cash and 0.4562 shares of Charter Class A common stock. Upon TWC’s stock conversion 
and merger completion, each Charter Class A common stock would be exchanged by 0.9042 
shares of New Charter Class A common stock.  
The cash consideration is expected to be financed with proceeds from debt issuance of $23.712 
million, a $4,300 million credit facility to fund TWC shareholders choosing option (B), the 
equity issuance of Liberty, and cash on hand form TWC. Based on the 275.3m shares 
outstanding (except Liberty), the cash proceeds can either be $27,528m or $31,657m. 
Liberty  
John Malone, the “cable-cowboy” and beneficially Charter’s largest shareholder with 
28,838,718 shares, is known for being the mastermind of Charter/TWC merger and its main 
backer. In fact, represented by Liberty Broadband and Liberty Interactive, Malone not only 
intends to rollover his current stock in both companies, giving up the right to receive cash for 
TWC shares, but has also agreed to purchase legacy Charter newly issued shares in a $4.3 
billion investment at a per-share price of $176.95. Regarding its stake in TWC - 7,723,357 
shares in aggregate – each share would be exchanged into 1.106 shares of Charter Class A 
common stock. In addition, concerning the BHN acquisition, Liberty has committed to 
purchase $700 million worth of Charter Class A common stock, for $172.9963 per share. 
BHN 
BHN is a private cable operator serving video, Internet, and voice services to approximately 
2.5 million American customers through the states of Florida, Michigan, Alabama, Indiana, and 
California. Its acquisition is also a cash and stock settlement, where BHN shareholders will be 
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entitled to receive a cash settlement of $2,014 million, plus 30,992,406 common units in one 
Charter subsidiary indirectly owning operating subsidiaries, exchangeable anytime into New 
Charter Class A common stock, and approximately 9.3 million convertible preferred units in 
the same entity, with a face amount of $2.5 billion and 6% annual dividend. 
New Charter 
Pending shareholders voting and regulatory approval, the transactions previously described will 
bring the second-largest U.S.-based cable company, just behind Comcast (Exhibit 16 displays 
New Charter estimated footprint). Legacy Charter, TWC and BWH will contribute with 13 
million cable passings serving 6.4 million customers, 15.5 million, and 2.5 million customers, 
respectively. Thus, New Charter will manage approximately 48.0 million passings totalling 
roughly 24.4 million customers, divided into 17.2 million video customers, 20.1 million high-
speed data customers, and 10.0 million voice customers. As of June 2015, Comcast was 
managing 27.3 million customer relationships. 
New Charter is intended to leverage its high-speed and more advanced services and products 
to TWC and BHN still analog signals, and integrate all customers into Charter SpectrumTM 
service bundle. Charter has also committed to upgrade acquired systems to provide 60 Mbps 
base speed.  
Consolidation will also cause cost synergies and tax benefits valued at $800 million annually. 
Decision 
In accordance with his active investing profile, Chris Hohn decided he would vote in person 
for or against the transactions, and which consideration option TCI would be entitled to receive 
in the case of voting “for”. Given the structure of the deal, the announced premium will not be 
guaranteed upon competition of transaction and can be extremely reduced, which can be risky 
for investors voting for the deal. This is explained by the cash-stock consideration ratio, and 
the fixed exchange ratios. TWC shareholders would then be exposed to Charter’s price stock 
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variation until the consummation of the merger. Additionally, regulators have shown resilience 
to approve consolidation from already too big operators. The outcome could be either refusing 
the deal, or taking up to one year to approve it.  
Chris Hohn was also considering other important industry- and company-specific risks that 
could jeopardize his long-term investment. Even with TCI long-term commitment and a 
considerable cash consideration, the exposure to Charter’s indebtedness increases risk, and 
Charter has proved it can severely harm shareholders value.  
 
Questions 
1. Describe the context in the cable industry and relate it with the rationale for the 
transactions. 
2. Describe the role of debt in cable companies. Are they a good candidate for 
leverage? 
3. Evaluate the role of Charter’s noteholders during filing for Chapter 11, and 
compare their investment philosophy to other type of sponsors described 
throughout the case.  
4. Why Time Warner Cable spun-off from its parent company? What is the role of 
the special dividend? 
5. Provide a valuation on Time Warner Cable (TWC), using multiples and DCF 
valuation methods. 
6. In how much did Charter value TWC, and BHN? Present the proceeds for each 
former shareholder, and provide corporate and beneficial ownership structure 
upon completion of transactions. 
7. Describe the merger rationale. What are the risks of the merger? 
8. Should Chris Hohn accept the transactions? Evaluate both options of payment. 
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Teaching Note 
1. As presented in the case, the cable industry is highly regulated and very competitive. 
Cable operators are challenged by innovative companies, like digital over-the-top providers that 
offer more convenience to customers, like Netflix’s Video on Demand. As stated by John 
Malone, New Charter will be able to offer meaningful Video on Demand through increasing 
content supply and negotiate better terms with television studios and national television 
channels providing specific content. Hence, competition is a driver for the merger.  
On the other hand, other traditional suppliers like telephone companies are leveraging their 
large network and client subscription to enter in paid-television and fixed-voice 
communications markets. Other industry-specific challenge is operational and pricing 
restrictions imposed by regulators, extremely concerned with American consumers that have 
ranked telecommunications industry as one of the worst in service quality and problem 
resolution duration. In fact, not only regulators impose antitrust restrictions on consolidation 
attempts, like the Comcast/TWC merger, but they also limit the day-to-day operations, like the 
franchising fee 5% ceiling that limits big operators to erase smaller competitors by offering 
better terms, better franchising conditions for new operators and more recurrent licensing 
issuances for new entrants, and retransmission consent that increases large operators operating 
costs.). Additionally, Title II reclassification will cut margins due to traffic-based fees.  
Plus, large investment requirements to upgrade legacy systems makes consolidation the only 
way for national operators to survive, since their business model relies on franchising licenses. 
Therefore, smaller cable operators may outperform bigger peers on penetration ratios due to 
easier access to licenses, which also makes them an acquisition target to big operators looking 
for franchising licenses. 
2. Cable companies have relied customer growth in cable systems expansions through 
acquisitions and joint ventures, and systems rebuilds and upgrades, both funded by long-term 
debt. Debt financing allows for cash on hand proceeds, then used to submit tender offers, 
improving the negotiation power of the acquirer. Additionally, issuing long-term debt allows 
for refinancing as market conditions get more advantageous at lower interest rates. However, 
the case of Charter reveals that highly levered cable companies are subject to debt market 
conditions and interest rate evolution. At maturity, if debt rollover or new credit facilities to 
replace old debt are limited, reorganization at Bankruptcy Court might be the only way to go 
further. Cable companies however, including Charter, have been able to operate under 
insolvency situation (negative book shareholders value). Moreover, the use of debt by cable 
companies are related with its equity ownership, since they are typically long-term investors 
committed to the company (examples of Paul Allen and John Malone). Therefore, it allows 
equityholders to bear more risk and have more control in operations with lower personal cash 
investments than if equity-backed. Students must point out that Charter’s use of debt is related 
to operational expansion, due to its historical negative earnings, and use TWC as an example 
of a profitable company using leverage as a way to reduce financial costs, retain profit, and tax 
savings through tax shields. Cable companies may look like good candidates for high 
debt/equity ratio due to their strong asset base. If in the past they were considered as a good 
candidate due to their strong market position and low competition (thus building natural 
monopolies, like AT&T), nowadays levering up a cable company has multiple risks. The risks 
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include: franchising and licensing restrictions that can limit cash flow generation; competition 
that weakens their ancient leading and defensible market positions; and strong capex 
requirements to expand, rebuild, and upgrade their systems. Even though there are efficiency 
and cost saving opportunities by clustering their systems in strategic regions and increase 
penetration rates in existing passings, its realization strongly depends on competition.  
3. In the case of Charter’s bankruptcy, private equity and hedge funds noteholders pursued 
a vulture investing strategy. This has been a common strategy among these asset classes, 
acquiring distressed low-valued debt securities before filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, 
and then entering in debt-to-equity swap agreements on the reorganization process to come out 
as equity owners, thus capturing future upside. The big discounts found in the secondary market 
allow these bankruptcy experts to profit from companies with a cleaner balance sheet and under 
new management. Usually, these financial sponsors aim to realize short-term returns. The not 
change in control in Charter after coming out from bankruptcy is up for classroom discussion, 
as it deviates from the typical Bankruptcy Court resolution. Throughout the case, other type of 
sponsors with different investment philosophies can be pointed out. Paul Allen and John 
Malone represent private strategic acquirers that design a personal agenda. Their investments 
were made in similar ways, as both committed significant personal wealth, both acquired 
strategic assets to integrate in their systems – Paul Allen paid higher prices per subscriber in 
his cable systems acquisitions – and both raised substantial amounts of debt to partially finance 
these acquisitions. Paul Allen’s vision of “The Wired World” demonstrates his personal agenda 
and strong believe in the industry. Strategic sponsors normally look for operational synergies 
and long-term returns. Chris Hohn represents active investing, even though with an uncommon 
investment strategy for this type of sponsor. These investors are known for investing in 
companies lacking intervention at some specific situation, or even at a turnaround situation. 
They tend to look for short-term profits as the identified situation or event is resolved. 
Additionally, Altice, and Charter itself, are also seen as strategic acquirers that are looking to, 
respectively, enter in a new market and to consolidate its position to become more competitive. 
Therefore, they tend to offer the highest premiums due to their long-term commitment given 
the nature of the assets acquires (cable systems), and the existence of many sources of synergies. 
4. Students are asked to describe a corporate spin-off. Spin-offs can occur from 
conglomerate discounts, meaning that both firms are worth more individually than combined, 
or if the parent company has not been able to find buyers that value the subsidiary at a fair 
valuation. At the case of TWC, it spun-off from Time Warner due to large capital requirements 
of the cable company. Overall group credit rating was getting affected by its large debt 
issuances. Moreover, it allows TWC management to have full control over their operations, and 
Time Warner more time to focus on their core business lines. The spin-off structure allows 
Time Warner to receive $10,856 million, attributing only shares to their shareholders. This 
special dividend is meant for tax efficiencies, meaning that Time Warner will then look to ways 
of returning this value to shareholders in a tax-efficient way. 
5. Students must use precedent transactions multiples and trading multiples to perform 
comparables valuation. Exhibit 2 lists some public M&A transactions in the 
telecommunications industry. Firstly, students must narrow down to a short-list of presented 
transactions, therefore not considering: BellSouth, Embarq, and MCI as they occurred in 
different market conditions and business cycle, and Kabel Deutschland, that despite being a 
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cable company, it supplies only the European market, therefore subject to a different level of 
regulation and “operational covenants”, and competition environment. Thus, given the median 
of the transactions and TWC 2014 EBITDA, its implied transaction value is $70,186 million. 
Students may also calculate the EBITDA as of June 2014, which from TWC 10-Q Quarterly 
Report was $4,304 million, to calculate LTM EBITDA as of June 2015 of $7,887 million. Its 
implied transaction value would then be $69,169 million. Using EV/TTM EBITDA from 
companies except TWC and Charter, and TWC 2014 EBITDA, one derives an enterprise value 
of $67,145 million. Considering LTM EBITDA as of June 2015, enterprise value would be 
$66,172 million. 
For a Discounted Cash Flow valuation analysis, students must first calculate unlevered free 
cash flows available to the firm for the five following years, and then discount at the appropriate 
discount rate. Teaching Note Exhibit 1 provides all valuation steps. Cost of debt is computed 
using TWC trading interest rates, and target debt/equity ratio is taken from comparables. All 
information necessary is provided in the case, and students are incentivized to use comparables 
metric for the calculation of terminal value and TWC unlevered beta. Therefore, TWC equity 
value is valued at $57,280 million, with an implied enterprise value of $79,568 million. 
6. Using solely the information provided in the case, given Charter’s price of May 22, 
2015 of $175.33, the equity price of TWC offered by Charter ranges from $55,126 million (all 
option A), and $55,168 million (all option B). Summing net debt as of June 2015, TWC 
Enterprise Value ranges from $77,698 million (all option A) to $77,740 million (all option B). 
Students must reach an equity value for BHN of $10,524 million and enterprise value of 
$10,477 million. Former TWC shareholders, other than Liberty, will receive between $27,525 
million in cash and $26,103 million in Legacy Charter’s stock (if all vote for option A), and 
$31,654 million in cash and $22,016 million in stock (if all vote for option B). Liberty will 
receive $1,498 million in stock. Former BHN owners will receive $2,014 million in cash and 
$8,507 million in stock. Students must first understand the difference between beneficial 
ownership and direct ownership, since former BHN shareholders will hold membership units 
in a New Charter’s subsidiary. As they may convert to New Charter Class A common stock, 
they become direct owners of The New Charter thereafter. Until conversion, they are beneficial 
owners of the holding company by holding subsidiaries equity. Therefore, former shareholders 
of Charter, TWC, and BHN, together with Liberty will beneficially own 100% of New Charter. 
Former Charter shareholders, except Liberty, will hold 24.3%-26.1%, former TWC, except 
Liberty will own 43.5%-39.4%, former BHN 13.0%-14.0%, and Liberty to own 19.2%-20.6% 
of New Charter (option A, followed by option B). At the first day of trading, Charter’s price is 
expected to adjust for the parent merger exchange ratio. 
7. The merger puts together two national cable operators looking to achieve three main 
aspects: operational synergies and product quality – TWC provides well clustered cable 
systems, but with a weak brand recognition among customers, and Charter offers better 
management skills and services at higher speeds (not surprisingly, Charter SpectrumTM is the 
brand to be used thereafter); competition strength – larger market position to compete with 
disruptive players, by integrating Charter’s 60 Mbps basic services to all TWC former 
customers and by investing in product development; and procurement power to negotiate better 
terms with popular national broadcast operators, and studios providing video content. 
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8. At the announcement date, premium offered to TWC shareholders was 13.82% - 
13.91%, and as of August 20, the premium offered was 5.98% - 5.73$. Therefore, there is the 
risk that the spread between announced premium and effective premium will keep decreasing. 
However, analysing TCI investment philosophy and the valuation of TWC, Chris Hohn should 
accept the deal. To reduce the premium variation risk, Hohn can go long in a put option with 
Charter’s stock as underlying asset with a strike price of $175.33, with a maturity of one year 
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Source: Leichtman Research Group, and Financial Times 
1 Representing 95% of the pay-television market 
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Source: Leichtman Research Group, and the Companies 
1 Data as of December 2014 for Bright House Networks, and as of September 2014 for Cox 



















       
Mar-2006 BellSouth AT&T Stock $83,105 million 9.66 19.45% 








CenturyLink  Stock $22,162 million 5.18 12.49% 
Sep-2015 Cablevision Systems Altice Cash $17,835 million 9.84 22.28% 
Oct-2008 Embarq Corp CenturyLink  Stock $12,566 million 4.83 30.76% 




Cash and stock $7,541 million 3.84 32.50% 
Jun-2014 TW Telecom 
Level 3 
Communications 




AT&T Cash $4,060 million 7.52 129.17% 






Cash $3,624 million 7.18 54.88% 
Mar-2014 LIN Media  Media General Cash and stock $2,450 million 15.35 27.15% 
 
























Cable Companies Telephone Companies
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Exhibit 3 Charter Communications early acquisitions (1993-1998)  
 






      
Feb-1994 
McDonald Group (10 
small cable systems) 
Louisiana, Georgia and 
Alabama 
$200 million 100,000 $2,000 
Jun-1994 Crown Media  
Connecticut, Kentucky, 
Missouri, North Carolina and 
South Carolina 
$900 million 630,0002  $1,429 
Jan-1995 Gaylord Entertainment  
California, North Carolina and 
South Carolina 
$370 million 180,000 $2,056 




Georgia $20 million 13,000 $1,538 




n.a. $211,1 million 100,000 $2,111 
Aug-1996 CVI Cable California  undisclosed 67,000 n.a. 
Feb-1997 Price Cable of Hickory North Carolina undisclosed 37,000 n.a. 




California and Utah $234 million 117,000 $2,000 
 
Source: Charter SEC filings 
1 Estimation based on transaction value and total subscribers base acquired 
2 Direct acquisition of 270,000 plus assumed management of 360,000 (partially acquired later in April 1996) 













St. Louis 230,000 
Los Angeles 250,000 
Northeast 100,000 
Southeast 400,000 
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Exhibit 5 Charter Communications acquisitions in 1999 
 















South Carolina, Georgia, 
North Carolina and Tennessee 
$1,293 million2 278,000 $4,651 
Feb-1999 
Rifkin Acquisition 
Partners and InterLink 
Communications 
Partners 
Florida, Virginia, West 
Virginia, Illinois, Indiana, 
New Mexico, Georgia and 
Tennessee  









Louisiana, Mississippi and 
Tennessee 




Alabama, Georgia, New 
Hampshire, North Carolina, 
West Virginia, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Pennsylvania, 
Louisiana and Vermont 
$550 million 171,000 $3,216 
May-1999 Avalon Cable TV 
Michigan, Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island and 
Vermont 
$832 million 270,800 $3,072 
May-1999 Vista Communications Georgia $126 million 26,000 $4,846 
May-1999 Falcon Cable TV 
California, Missouri, North 
Carolina, Alabama and 
Georgia 




West Virginia, Pennsylvania, 
Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Louisiana and Wisconsin 





Wisconsin and Nebraska 
$3,078 million 695,800 $4,424 
Aug-1999 
Cable Satellite of 
South Miami (cable 
system) 
Florida $22 million 9,000 $2,444 
      
Source: Charter SEC filings 
1 Estimation based on acquisition cost and total subscribers base acquired 
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Exhibit 6 Charter Communications, Inc. ownership and organizational structure after the 





Source: Charter SEC filings 
1 Includes 170,000,000 shares issued upon the closing of the offer, plus an over-allotment option of 
25,500,000 shares granted to underwriters, fully exercised  
2 Although one Class B common stock is entitled to only ten votes, Charter’s voting rights dictate that 
Paul Allen benefits from the same ratio for other Charter Communication Holding Company’s 
membership units exchangeable at any time for Class A common stock on a one-for-one basis, held by 
him or other affiliates  
3 Charter Communications Holding Company is the company that establishes agreements to purchase 
other cable systems or its parent companies  
4 Charter Communications Operating is a holding company owning all cable systems, including Charter 


























Class A Common Stock
(publicly owned):
• 195,500,000 shares1
• Price of $19
Net proceeds 
$3,547,920,000
Class B Common Stock
(owned by Paul Allen):
• 50,000 shares





Vulcan Cable III, Inc.
Former owners of Falcon and 
Bresnan cable systems
Charter Investment, Inc.
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Exhibit 7 Charter Communications acquisitions in 2000-2008 
 










Minnesota $13 million 6,000 $2,166 
Apr-2000 Capital Cable n.a. $60 million 23,200 $2,586 




Michigan $171 million 50,700 $3,373 
Jun-2001 AT&T Broadband 
Missouri, Illinois, Alabama, 
Nevada, and California 
$1,736 million 551,100 $3,150 
Aug-2001 Cable USA 
Nebraska, Minnesota, and 
Colorado 
$100 million 30,600 $3,268 
Feb-2002 
High Speed Access 
Corp.2 





Illinois $63 million 28,000 $2,250 
Jan-2006 Seren Innovations Minnesota $42 million 53,200 $789 
      
Source: Charter SEC filings 
1 Estimation based on acquisition cost and total subscribers base acquired 
   
2 Acquisition of contracts and associated assets related to data services, including a customer contact center, a network 
operations center and provisioning software 
3 On April 2002 Charter acquired 21,600 customers for $48 million, and on September 2002 completed the transaction with 





Exhibit 8 Charter's sale of assets 2003-2008 
 






      





Maryland, Delaware, West 
Virginia, and New York 
$735 million 351,900 $2,089 
Jul-2005 n.a. 
Texas, West Virginia, and 
Nebraska 
$37 million 33,000 $1,121 











Nevada, Colorado, New 
Mexico, and Utah 
43,000 
      
Source: Charter SEC filings 
1 Estimation based on acquisition cost and total subscribers base acquired 
2 Only aggregated data available for the asset sale of 2006 
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Source: Charter SEC filings 
1 Although one Class B common stock is entitled to only ten votes, Charter’s voting rights dictate that 
Paul Allen benefits from the same ratio for other Charter Communication Holding Company’s 
membership units exchangeable at any time for Class A common stock on a one-for-one basis, held by 
him or other affiliates 
2 On January 1999, Vulcan Cable III, Inc. merged into Charter Investments, both wholly owned by Paul 
Allen, being the latter the surviving entity, therefore transferring the 15.5% beneficial ownership in 






























Class A Common Stock 
(411,737,894 shares outstanding):
• 7% owned by Paul Allen
• 93% owned by public 
investors and employees
Class B Common Stock
(50,000 shares outstanding):
• 100% owned by Paul Allen
Charter Communications 
Holding Company, LLC.
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December 31, 2008 





     
Charter Communications, Inc.     
5.875% convertible senior notes due 2009 3  11/16/09 
6.50% convertible senior notes due 2027  373  10/1/27 
Charter Communications Holdings, LLC.     
10.000% senior notes due 2009  53  4/1/09 
10.750% senior notes due 2009  4  10/1/09 
9.625% senior notes due 2009  25  11/15/09 
10.250% senior notes due 2010  1  1/15/10 
11.750% senior discount notes due 2010  1  1/15/10 
11.125% senior notes due 2011  47  1/15/11 
13.500% senior discount notes due 2011  60  1/15/11 
9.920% senior discount notes due 2011  51  4/1/11 
10.000% senior notes due 2011  69  5/15/11 
11.750% senior discount notes due 2011  54  5/15/11 
12.125% senior discount notes due 2012  75  1/15/12 
CCH I Holdings, LLC.     
11.125% senior notes due 2014  151  1/15/14 
13.500% senior discount notes due 2014  581  1/15/14 
9.920% senior discount notes due 2014  471  4/1/14 
10.000% senior notes due 2014  299  5/15/14 
11.750% senior discount notes due 2014  815  5/15/14 
12.125% senior discount notes due 2015  217  1/15/15 
CCH I, LLC.     
11.00% senior notes due 2015  4,072  10/1/15 
CCH II, LLC.     
10.250% senior notes due 2010  1,857  9/15/10 
10.250% senior notes due 2013  598  10/1/13 
CCO Holdings, LLC.     
8.750% senior notes due 2013  796  11/15/13 
Credit facility  350  9/6/14 
Charter Communications Operating, LLC.     
8.000% senior second-lien notes due 2012 1,100  4/30/12 
8 3/8% senior second-lien notes due 2014 770  4/30/14 
10.875% senior second-lien notes due 2014 527  9/15/14 






Source: Charter SEC filings 
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Charter Communications, Inc.   
Convertible senior notes  376 • $25 million in cash 
• Charter’s 5.5 million shares of preferred stock1  
Charter Communications Holdings, LLC.  
 
Senior notes and senior discount notes 440 • 1.3 million warrants to purchase shares of new 
Charter Class A common stock (k=$51.28 per share)  
CCH I Holdings, LLC. 
  
Senior notes and senior discount notes 2,534 • 6.4 million warrants to purchase shares of new 
Charter Class A common stock (k=$46.86 per share) 
CCH I, LLC. 
  
Senior notes  4,072 • 21.1 million shares of new Class A common stock 
CCH II, LLC. 
  
Senior notes 2,455 • New CCH II, LLC senior notes at $2,092 million2 
CCO Holdings, LLC. 
  
8.750% senior notes due 2013 796 • Remained outstanding, valued at $812 million 
Credit facility 350 • Remained outstanding, valued at $304 million 
Charter Communications Operating, LLC. 
  
8.000% senior second-lien notes due 2012 1,100 • Remained outstanding, valued at $1,120 million 
8 3/8% senior second-lien notes due 2014 770 • Remained outstanding, valued at $779 million 
10.875% senior second-lien notes due 2014 527 • Remained outstanding, valued at $601 million 
Credit facilities 8,246 • Remained outstanding, valued at $7,614 million 






   
Charter Communications, Inc. 54.80%  
Class A common stock  • No recovery 
Class B common stock  • No recovery 
Charter Investment, Inc.3 45.20%  
Wholly owned by Paul Allen 
 
• 2.2 million shares of new Class B common stock4 
(35% of voting power of Charter's new capital stock) 
• 4.7 million warrants to purchase shares of new 
Charter Class A common stock (k=$19.80 per share) 
• $85 million principal amount of new CCH II notes,  
• $195 million in cash 
Rights Offering:   
Charter Communications, Inc.   
Class A common stock 
 
• CCH I, LLC. noteholders purchased new Charter 
Class A common stock for $1,663 million 
     
1 15% Pay-in-Kind preferred stock, redeemed for approximately $143 million on April 16, 2010 
2 Minus $85 million of principal amount given to CCH I, LLC. noteholders, then transferred to Paul Allen 
3 Charter Investment, Inc. retained a minority interest of 1% in Charter Communications Holding Company, LCC. fully 
converted into Charter Class A common stock, becoming fully owned by Charter Communications, Inc. 
4 Equal to 2% of Charter's equity value, convertible into Class A common stock on a one-for-one basis 
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Exhibit 12 Time Warner Cable acquisitions (1995-2013)  
 










North Carolina, and Georgia $533 million2 162,000 $3,290 
Jul-1995 KBLCOM 
Texas, Minnesota, Oregon, 
California, Florida, and New 
York 
$2,341 million2 1,672,0003 $2,138 
Jan-1996 Cablevision Industries 
New York, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Florida and 
California 




California, Ohio, New York, 
and Texas 
$ 14,400 million 4,000,000 $3,600 












North Carolina, and South 
Carolina 
$572 million n.a. n.a. 
      
Sources: Time Warner Cable SEC filings 
1 Estimation based on acquisition cost and total subscribers base acquired 
2 The offers were financed by issuance of common and preferred equity, plus assumed debt as reported on Time Warner, Inc. 
SEC 10-K form for the year end 1995. Equity value is computed based on shares outstanding and aggregate market value as 
reported, and price and conversion ratio for preferred stock series 
3 KBLCOM owned cable systems serving 700,000 customers, and a 50% interest in Paragon Communications serving 
790,000. Time Warner Cable already owned the other 50% 
4 NaviSite provides a range of managed hosting, cloud, application and messaging services and other related IT and 
professional services to businesses across a variety of industries 
5 DukeNet was a regional fiber optic network company that provided data and high-capacity bandwidth services to wireless 
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Sources: Time Warner Cable SEC filings 
1 Includes all public stockholders, directors, and employees with less than 4% beneficial ownership 
2 Axa Financial, Inc. ownership is based on Time Warner’s SEC 14A filing of April 2007, since it also 
held convertible equity securities. An approximation of ownership from other stockholders holding 
more than 4% is also presented, based on shares outstanding reported on Time Warner’s SEC 10-K 
filing of February 2007, and shares individually owned as of end of first quarter of 2007 listed on 
Bloomberg 
3 Each share of Class B common stock is entitled to ten votes 
4 Time Warner Cable, LLC. is a holding company that owns directly and indirectly all cable systems 




























Class A Common Stock 
(901,913,430 shares outstanding)
Class B Common Stock
(75,000,000 shares outstanding)3
Time Warner Cable, Inc.




Public stockholders, directors, 
and employees1
ClearBridge Investments, LLC. Dodge & Cox
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Exhibit 14A Charter Communications consolidated financial data 
 
Consolidated Income Statement 
Years Ended December 31, 
  
Six Months 
Ended June 30, 
(in millions of USD, except per share data) 2012  2013  2014  2015 
        
Revenues $7,504  $8,155  $9,108  $4,792 
Cost of Goods Sold (4,860)  (5,345)  (5,973)  (3,182) 
Gross Profit $2,644  $2,810  $3,135  $1,610 
Depreciations and Amortizations (1,713)  (1,854)  (2,102)  (1,042) 
Other Operating Expense (15)  (47)  (62)  (50) 
Operating Income $916  $909  $971  $518 
Net Interest Expense (907)  (846)  (911)  (518) 
Other non-Operating income (56)  (112)  (7)  (133) 
Pre-tax Income ($47)  ($49)  $53  ($133) 
Income Tax Expense (257)  (120)  (236)  (70) 
Net Income ($304)  ($169)  ($183)  ($203) 
       
 
EBITDA $2,629  $2,763  $3,073 
 
$1,560 
EPS ($3.37)  ($1.82)  ($1.88)  ($1.82) 
Charter Class A Common Stock           112,027,916         
       
 
Consolidated Balance Sheet 2012  2013  2014  2015 
        
Assets        
Cash and Cash Equivalents $7  $21  $3 
 
$30 
Accounts and Notes Receivables $234  $234  $285 
 
$321 
Other Short Term Assets $92  $67  $57 
 
$105 
Total Current Assets $333  $322  $345  $456 
Property, Plant, and Equipment $7,206  $7,981  $8,373 
 
$8,244 
Franchises and Customer Relationships $6,711  $7,646  $7,111 
 
$6,984 
Goodwill $953  $1,177  $1,168 
 
$1,168 
Total Investment in Cable Properties $14,870  $16,804  $16,652  $16,396 
Other Non-Current Assets $396  $169  $7,391 
 
$467 
Total Assets $15,599   $17,295   $24,388   $17,319 
       
 
Liabilities and Shareholders Equity        
Payables and Accruals $1,224  $1,467  $1,635 
 
$1,636 
Total Current Liabilities $1,224  $1,467  $1,635  $1,636 
Long Term Debt $12,808  $14,181  $20,887 
 
$13,896 
Other Long Term Liabilities $1,418  1496  $1,720  $1,818 
Total Non-Current Liabilities $14,226  $15,677  $22,607  $15,714 
Total Liabilities $15,450  $17,144  $24,242  $17,350 
Total Equity $149   $151   $146   ($31) 
Total Liabilities and Shareholders Equity $15,599  $17,295  $24,388  $17,319 
Exhibit 14B Time Warner Cable consolidated financial data 
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Consolidated Income Statement Years Ended December 31,  
Six Months 
Ended June 30, 
(in millions of USD, except per share data) 2012  2013  2014  2015 
        
Revenues $21,386  $22,120  $22,812  $11,703 
Cost of Goods Sold (9,942)  (10,342)  (5,294)  (7,677) 
Gross Profit $11,444  $11,778  $17,518  $4,026 
Selling, General and Administrative (3,620)  (3,798)  (2,192)  - 
Depreciations and Amortizations (3,264)  (3,281)  (3,371)  (1,805) 
Other Operating Expense (115)  (119)  (7,323)  (108) 
Operating Income $4,445  $4,580  $4,632  $2,113 
Net Interest Expense (1,606)  (1,552)  (1,419)  (698) 
Other non-Operating income 497  11  35  137 
Pre-tax Income $3,336  $3,039  $3,248  $1,552 
Income Tax Expense (1,177)  (1,085)  (1,217)  (631) 
Net Income $2,159  $1,954  $2,031  $921 
        
EBITDA $7,709  $7,861  $8,003  $3,918 
EPS $6.97  $6.76  $7.21  $3.22 
TWC Common Stock           282,974,273        
        
Consolidated Balance Sheet 2012   2013   2014  2015 
        
Assets        
Cash and Cash Equivalents $3,454  $525  $707  $480 
Accounts and Notes Receivables $883  $954  $949  $1,029 
Other Short Term Assets $540  $665  $383  $565 
Total Current Assets $4,877  $2,144  $2,039  $2,074 
Property, Plant, and Equipment $14,742  $15,056  $15,990  $16,604 
Franchises and Customer Relationships $26,652  $26,564  $26,535  $26,305 
Goodwill $2,889  $3,196  $3,137  $3,138 
Other Long Term Assets $649  $1,313  $434  $765 
Total Non-Current Assets $44,932  $46,129  $46,096  $46,812 
Total Assets $49,809   $48,273   $48,135   $48,886 
        
Liabilities and Shareholders Equity        
Payables and Accruals $2,210  $2,095  $2,087  $3,835 
Short Term Debt $1,518  $1,767  $1,017  $320 
Other Short Term Liabilities $1,597  $1,364  $1,393  $0 
Total Current Liabilities $5,325  $5,226  $4,497  $4,155 
Long Term Debt $25,171  $23,285  $22,604  $22,732 
Other Long Term Liabilities $12,030  $12,815  $13,017  $13,487 
Total Non-Current Liabilities $37,201  $36,100  $35,621  $36,219 
Total Liabilities $42,526  $41,326  $40,118  $40,374 
Total Equity $7,283   $6,947   $8,017   $8,512 
Total Liabilities and Shareholders Equity $49,809  $48,273  $48,135  $48,886 
Exhibit 15 Charter, TWC, and peers trading multiples 




 (in USD 
millions) 
Enterprise Value  
(in USD 
millions) 
EV / TTM 
EBITDA 






        
Verizon 
Communications 
$201,558.8 $305,054.8 8.44 14.61 0.57 4.96 31.40% 
AT&T $180,041.3 $253,826.3 8.33 17.8 0.50 1.08 33.50% 
Comcast $147,106.4 $192,251.4 8.39 15.96 1.04 1.12 32.20% 
Time Warner 
Cable 
$51,901.2 $74,819.2 9.35 22.76 - - 39.00% 
DirecTV $46,157.0 $62,719.0 7.77 14.71 - - - 
DISH $31,951.6 $36,856.3 12.7 27.33 0.95 3.34 34.70% 
Charter 
Communications1 
$21,632.6 $42,576.6 13.77 77.30 1.12 1.58 27.00% 
Cablevision $7,126.7 $15,355.8 8.48 14.23 - - - 
EchoStar $4,520.3 $5,290.3 5.98 27.92 0.64 0.95 44.40% 
        
Sources: Time Warner Cable SEC filings 
1As of deal announcement May 23, 2015, except for Charter Communications data as of March 31. 2015 
 
 









Exhibit 17 Auxiliary data 
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(in millions of USD, 
except per share data) 
 For and as of the Years Ended December 31, 
 2015E  2016E  2017E  2015 
         
TWC Revenues  $23,807  $25,409  $26,482  $27,937 
         
      Outstanding 
Balance as of 
  
TWC outstanding debt  Maturity  Interest Rate  June 30, 2015   
         
TWC notes and debentures 2017-2042  5.874%  $20,601   
TWCE debentures  2023-2033  7.910%  $2,058   
Commercial paper program 2017  0.559%  $313   
Capital leases  2016-2042    $80   
Total debt      $23,052   
         
Markets (June, 2015)  Rate (%)       
20-Year US Treasury rate 2.98%       
Equity risk premium 5.50%       
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Teaching Note Exhibit 1 
 
  Historical Period CAGR Projection Period CAGR 
  2012 2013 2014 ('12-14) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 ('12-14) 
Sales  $21,386 $22,120 $22,812 3.3% $23,807 $25,409 $26,482 $27,937 $29,194 5.2% 
% growth  N.A. 3.4% 3.1%  4.4% 6.7% 4.2% 5.5% 4.5%  
Cost of Goods Sold  9,942 10,342 5,294  5,952 6,352 6,621 6,984 7,299  
% sales  46.5% 46.8% 23.2%  25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0%  
Gross Profit  $11,444 $11,778 $17,518 23.7% $17,855 $19,057 $19,862 $20,953 $21,896 5.2% 
% margin  53.5% 53.2% 76.8%  75.0% 75.0% 75.0% 75.0% 75.0%  
Selling, General & Administrative  3,735 3,917 9,515  9,523 10,164 10,593 11,175 11,678  
% sales  17.5% 17.7% 41.7%  40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0%  
EBITDA  $7,709 $7,861 $8,003 1.9% $8,332 $8,893 $9,269 $9,778 $10,218 5.2% 
% margin  36.0% 35.5% 35.1%  35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0%  
Depreciation and Amortization  3,264 3,281 3,371  3,571 3,811 3,972 4,191 4,379  
EBIT  $4,445 $4,580 $4,632 2.1% $4,761 $5,082 $5,296 $5,587 $5,839 5.2% 
% margin  20.8% 20.7% 20.3%  20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0%  
Taxes @ 39%  1,734 1,786 1,806  1,857 1,982 2,066 2,179 2,277  
EBIAT  $2,711 $2,794 $2,826 2.1% $2,904 $3,100 $3,231 $3,408 $3,562 5.2% 
            
Plus: Depreciation & Amortization  3,264 3,281 3,371  3,571 3,811 3,972 4,191 4,379  
Less: Capital Expenditures  (3,095) (3,198) (4,097)  (4,250) (4,250) (4,179) (4,208) (3,512)  
Less: Change in Net Working 
Capital      $139 $154 $103 $140 $121  
            
Unlevered Free Cash Flow           $2,365 $2,815 $3,127 $3,531 $4,550  
WACC 5.44%           
Discount Period      1 2 3 4 5  
Discount Factor      0.95 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.77  
           
Present Value of Free Cash Flow           $2,243 $2,532 $2,668 $2,856 $3,491  
  44 
WACC calculation      Calculation of Terminal Value using EMM  Enterprise Value   
Target Capital Structure    Terminal Year EBITDA (2019E) $10,218  Present Value of FCF $13,790 
Debt-to-Equity  217.2%  Exit Multiple  8.39  Terminal Value $65,778 
Debt-to-Total Capitalization  68.5%  Terminal Value $85,729     
Equity-to-Total Capitalization  31.5%      Enterprise Value $79,568 
    Implied Perpetuity Growth Rate       
Cost of debt    Terminal Year FCF $4,550     
Cost of debt  6.0%  Discount Rate 5.44%  Implied Equity Value and Share Price 
Tax rate  39.0%  Terminal Value $85,729  Enterprise Value $79,568 
After-tax Cost of Debt  3.6%      Less: Total Debt $22,764 
    Implied Perpetuity Growth Rate -0.15%  Less: Preferred Stock  
Cost of Equity        Less: Non-controlling Interest $4 
Risk-free rate  2.98%  Terminal Value    Plus: Cash and Cash equivalents $480 
Market Risk Premium  5.5%  Terminal Year EBITDA (2019E) $10,218     
Unlevered Beta  0.37  Exit Multiple  8.39  Implied Equity Value $57,280 
Levered Beta  1.16  Terminal Value $85,729     
Size Premium    Discount Factor 0.76728636     
Cost of Equity  9%         
    Present Value of Terminal Value $65,778     
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Working Capital Projections  Historical Period  Projection Period 
  2012 2013 2014  2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Sales  $21,386 $22,120 $22,812  $23,807 $25,409 $26,482 $27,937 $29,194 
Cost of Goods Sold  9,942 10,342 5,294  5,952 6,352 6,621 6,984 7,299 
           
Current Assets                     
Accounts Receivables  883 954 949  990 1,057 1,102 1,162 1,215 
Inventories  - - -  - - - - - 
Prepaid Expenses and Other  540 665 383  400 427 445 469 490 
Total Current Assets  $1,423 $1,619 $1,332  $1,390 $1,484 $1,546 $1,631 $1,705 
           
Current Liabilities                     
Accounts Payable  653 565 567  637 680 709 748 782 
Accrued Liabilities  1557 1530 1520  1586 1693 1765 1861 1945 
Other Current Liabilities  1597 1364 1393  1454 1552 1617 1706 1783 
Total Current Liabilities  $3,807 $3,459 $3,480  $3,678 $3,925 $4,091 $4,315 $4,510 
           
Net Working Capital  -$2,384 -$1,840 -$2,148   -$2,287 -$2,441 -$2,544 -$2,684 -$2,805 
% sales  -11.15% -8.32% -9.42%  -9.61% -9.61% -9.61% -9.61% -9.61% 
           
Change in Net Working Capital   -$544 $308  $139 $154 $103 $140 $121 
           
           
Assumptions           
Current Assets           
Days Sales Outstanding  15.07 15.74 15.18  15.18 15.18 15.18 15.18 15.18 
Days Inventory Held  - - -  - - - - - 
Prepaid and Other CA(% of sales)  2.53% 3.01% 1.68%  1.68% 1.68% 1.68% 1.68% 1.68% 
           
Current liabilities           
Days Payable Outstanding  23.97 19.94 39.09  39.09 39.09 39.09 39.09 39.09 
Accrued Liabilities (% of sales)  7.28% 6.92% 6.66%  6.66% 6.66% 6.66% 6.66% 6.66% 
Other Current Liabilities (% of sales) 7.47% 6.17% 6.11%  6.11% 6.11% 6.11% 6.11% 6.11% 
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